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Existence Claims in the Posterior Analytics
Richard D. McKirahan, #r.
Pomona College
March 1988 meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Portland, Oregon
I. Introduction
In the APo Aristotle discusses the nature of scientific 
knowledge and of science. A science (έπυστημη) is an organized 
body of facts or propositions1 which deals with a particular 
subject genus (γένοςt υποκείμενον γε'νος) of existing things. The 
bulk of a science consists of syllogistic proofs or 
demonstrations which show that their conclusions hold and must be 
the case and also why they hold and must be the case. The most 
frequently cited specimen of a conclusion of a scientific 
demonstration is the fact or proposition that triangles have 
angles whose sum is equal to two right angles. Aristotle thinks 
of this fact as a relation or connection between a subject 
(triangle) and an attribute (having triangles whose sum is equal 
to two right angles). He argues2 that a science must contain 
unprovable principles from which all the remaining facts are 
proved. He lists six properties of scientific principles: they
are (a) true, (b) primary, (c) immediate, and (d) more 
intelligible than, (e) prior to, and (f) grounds for the 
conclusions.3 Moreover, he has a good deal to say about the 
various types of principles.4 In the first place, some, which he 
calls axioms, are common (κουνά) in that they are used as 
principles in more than one science5 and others, the "proper" 
principles (υδυα) are restricted to a single science. Aristotle 
identifies two kinds of proper principles. One of these kinds is 
definitions, which state the essence of the subjects and 
attributes in the science's subject genus. The other kind of 
proper principle turns out to be assumptions of existence. In 
the present paper I shall discuss a number of features of these 
existence claims and shall attempt to make sense of them in the 
context of an Aristotelian demonstrative science.
In APo 1.2 Aristotle identifies three kinds of scientific 
principles: axioms, definitions, and a third kind which he calls
hypotheses and which he introduces in a way that leaves it an 
open question whether hypotheses are restricted to, or even 
include existence claims.
"Among immediate deductive principles, I call a 
thesis one which it is not possible to prove, but 
is not necessary for a person to have if he is 
going to learn anything.... Among theses, one 
which assumes either of the members of a contra­
diction (i.e., I mean, that something exists or 
does not exist) is an hypothesis." (1.2 72al4-16, 
al8-20)
This passage can be taken in different ways, since the words
PAGE 2
translated "i.e., I mean” (οΕον λέγω) can also be translated 
"e.g." (which would allow for more hypotheses than existence 
claims) and the word translated “exists” can also be rendered 
"is” and it can be taken simply as referring to any subject- 
predicate statement: "that something is (f) or is not (f) ," or
"that something is [the case] or is not [the case]."
1.2 is not definitive, but 1.10 may be taken to be. Two kinds 
of proper principles are identified as needed for a science: 
assumptions what something is or what it signifies (τέ έστι, τέ 
σημαένευ) and that something is (ότι/ εστι,, τοεϊναυ, etc.). 
Moreover, there is nothing in 1.10 or in the discussion of 
scientific per se predications and necessity (1.4-1.6) to suggest 
that there are any scientific propositions attributing an 
attribute to a subject which are not either definitional 
propositions or propositions deduced from definitions. Therefore 
there is no reason - to think that the assumption that something is 
is anything more than a statement of existence.
This view is supported by II.1-2, which carefully distinguish 
questions whether something exists (ευ εστυ) from questions 
whether something has a given attribute (οτυ).
The only further confirmation that could reasonably be 
demanded is an account of the role such assumptions play in a 
science, to show that they are needed by sciences and have a 
distinct function from the other two kinds of principles, and 
also to show that Aristotle might reasonably have supposed that 
these three kinds of principles he identifies are sufficient, 
that sciences as he conceives them do not need further kinds of 
principles. I shall not discuss the question of sufficiency in 
the present paper, but shall consider what existence assumptions 
are needed in an Aristotelian demonstrative science, the role 
they play in the structure of demonstrative sciences, and how 
well they meet the requirements Aristotle places on scientific 
principles. Afterwards I shall take up the difficult guestion 
whether scientific existence claims are necessary truths, since 
it is an issue which divides interpretations of APo and which 
threatens the very possibility of there being any demonstrative 
sciences.
II. Existence Assumptions of Primitive Subjects
1.10 contains the primary passages for understanding what 
existence claims a demonstrative science needs.
"Proper things are (a) those things which are 
assumed to exist, concerning which the science 
investigates the attributes which belong to them 
£ê£ se.... They assume that these exist and that 
they are this, (b) The per se attributes of these
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they assume what each signifies.” (1. 10 761)3-4, b3-7)
This view is repeated just below.
•'Every demonstrative science is concerned with 
three things, (a) as many things as are posited to 
exist (these are the genus whose per se attributes 
the science investigates)..., (c) the attributes, 
of which the science assumes what each signifies.”
(i. VO 76b 11-13, b 15- 16)
These passages agree that the distinction between subjects and 
attributes is mirrored in a distinction in the kinds of 
principles having to do with each. Definitions of both subjects 
and attributes are assumed, but the existence of only the 
subjects is assumed; that of the attributes is proved. How their 
existence is proved is no mystery. Their existence is adjectival 
and for an attribute to exist is for it to belong to a subject 
which exists. Since sciences deal with necessary, per se 
relations of subject and attribute, it is sufficient to prove 
that an existing subject has I per se) a given attribute. The 
existence of the attribute (in its appropriate adjectival way) 
follows.
The picture presented here is simple; assume the existence of 
ail the subjects, prove that the subjects have their per se 
attributes, and that yives us the existence of the attributes.
3ut elsewhere Aristotle is more sophisticated. Some subjects can 
be proved to exist, ^iven tie existence of others. Therefore if 
is necessary to assume the existence of only some subjects 
(primitive or primary subjects) and possible to prove the 
existence of the rest (derivative subjects).
”1 call principles in each genus those which it is 
not possible to prove that they exist. Bhat both 
the primary and the derivative things signify is 
assumed, but it is necessary to assume that the 
principles exist and prove that the others do- 
?or example, it is necessary to assume what unit 
signifies and what straight and triangle do, and 
that the unit and magnitude exist, but it is 
necessary to prove the rest.” (1. 10 76a3 1-6)
In rhe first sentence, ’'principles” (άρχάς) cannot be read in its 
normal meaning of improvable premisses. It may refer to 
primitive {as opposed to derivative) subjects, and the examples 
of things whose existence is assumed may be understood as 
primitive subjects, as opposed to a derivative subject like 
tricingle. Nevertheless, it is not certain that Aristotle intends 
the distinction between .primitive and derivative subjects here.
It is possible to read the passage simply as distinguishing 
subjects ("primary things”) from attributes ("derivative 
things"). On the other hand, the distinction between primitive 
and derivative subjects occurs quite clearly at the beginning of
.book II
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There we filial a fourfold division of "things which are 
investigated·" For our purposes most important is the 
distinction quoted above between determining whether something 
exists (εύ εστε) and whether a subject has an attribute (pxt) »
"When we investigate ... whether the sun is eclip­
sing or not, we are investigating the fact (δτυ).
Evidence for this is that when we have found that 
it is eciix>sing, our investigation is at an 
end... Some things we investigate in a different 
way, e.g., if a centaur or god is or is not. I 
mean 'if it is or is not' (εΰ εστυν η μη ) without 
guaiification, not if it is white or not." (II.1 
89125-7, b 11-3}
It is clear as can be that a statement that something "is without 
qualification" is distinguished from statements that something 
(sone subject) has an attribute, and it is surely correct to see 
Aristotle intending the distinction between existence and 
predication by his distinction between complete (άπλως) and 
incomplete7 uses of the verb 'to be* (είναυ). Accordingly, I 
shall translate εστυ as "exists."
Aristotle's doctrine in 11. 1-2 is complicated and its full 
explication demands a lengthy treatment. Here I shall set out 
only what is relevant to the present question. In 11.2 Aristotle 
examines the relations among the four kinds of investigations 
identified in II.1. He gives further examples of things of which 
we might investigate whether they exist; the moon, earth, sun, 
or triangle8 and identifies these as subjects.9 He speaks of 
looking for "the middle," which is the grounds or explanation10 
He calls the middle and grounds/expianation the 'what it is' (tii 
έστε), by which he shows that he means the scientific definition. 
How a definition can be an explanation of something’s existence 
is a problem I cannot discuss here, but for now it is sufficient 
to note that the presence of the notions of 'middle* and 
'grounds/expianation' proves that Aristotle is thinking of a 
context of scientific demonstration- Just as when we know the 
fact (8τυ) we proceed to look for its grounds by looking for a 
middle of a proof (i.e., the nexus of immediate relations that is 
founded on scientific principles) of which the given fact is a 
conclusion, so »hen we know that something exists, we proceed to 
look for the middle of a proof that that thing exists.
Thus, proofs of the existence of subjects take their place 
alongside proofs of per se relations between subjects and 
attributes. This entails the distinction between primitive and 
derivative subjects corresponding to that between unprovabie 
(immediate) and provable (derivative) facts. Although this 
distinction complicates the structure of an Aristotelian 
demonstrative science beyond the simple picture presented 
above,11 the result is significant. Cn this more sophisticated
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view, the number of principies is reduced and we find that not 
ail subjects are on an equal footing, but that some are superior 
to others from the point of view of priority and intelligibility. 
The principles that remain are correspondingly richer in content 
than they were on the simple picture, and there is no loss to the 
content of the science because the totality of its scientific 
propositions {its principles and conclusions taken ensemble) 
remains the same. The most important gain is the increased 
amount of order that is found in the science*s subject genus.
III. The Sole of Existence Assumptions
k'hat role to the existence assumptions play in a demonstrative 
science? Someone might argue that sciences can do as well 
without them as with them. If the main interest of science is to 
prove per se relations between subjects and attributes, and if 
these depend on the definitions of the terms involved, existence 
is irrelevant. It follows from the definition of triangle {and 
other definitions) that all triangles per se have angles whose 
sum equals two right angles, and the proof does not require that 
tkeie be triangles. In fact, Aristotle's distinction between per 
se facts and existence claims effectively makes existence claims 
useless in proofs. If the form of a demonstration is
A belongs per se to B 
B belongs per se to C 
Therefore, A belongs per se to C
there simply is no need and no room for either primitive or 
derivative existence claims in demonstrations.
Ihere are a lumber of possible responses to this attack. 
Perhaps the most obvious is that Aristotle's recognition of 
existence proofs requires conclusions of the form 'A's exist,’ 
and so requires premisses of the same form. Thus, existence 
claims are not irrelevant and are in fact central to one of the 
maic types of demonstrations recognized in APo.
Eore general considerations come out of Aristotle's views on 
essence, which is the basis for per se predication. To put the 
matter simply, things which do not exist do not have essences. 
Things which do not have essences do not have per se áttributes. 
It follows that things which do not exist are irrelevant to 
science. There is no science of the non-existent. In order to 
be a satisfactory subject of a science, a subject must exist —  
not only exist, we may add, but also be a subject in the subject 
genus of the science.
"It is necessary for a person who knows what is 
(τι έστυν) man or anything else to know also that 
it exists. {For no one knows what the non-existent
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is, only what the formula or name signifies, when 
I say g oat-stag. But it is impossible to know 
what a goat-stag is.)” (II.7 92bh-3)
The distinction between ”what x signifies" (η' σημαίνει) and 
”what x is” (τί έστυ) is that the latter can be known only when 
we know that x exists. The same words that express what a thing 
is can also express what it signifies. The difference is not in 
their form or content, but depends on whether they characterize 
an entity or a non-entity like a goat-stag. Aristotle implies 
that the same expression indicates ”what it signifies” to one 
person and ”what. it is” to another, if the first does not know 
that x exists and the second does. Similarly, an expression that 
indicates ”what it signifies” to someone at some time will later, 
after he has learned that it exists, indicate ”what it is.”
Now Aristotle’s doctrine of per se predication is closely 
related with the notion of "what it is." To put it briefly, a 
per se predication is either a predication which is stated in a 
definition or is implied by other per se predications which are 
stated in definitions, and definitions are statements of essence, 
of "what it is-"12 A, or the. work of a science is to investigate 
per se relations among the subjects and attributes it treats.1  ^
But in order for something to have any per se relations, it must 
exist, since only so will it have a "what it is" as opposed to a 
"what it signifies."
Thus the distinction between "what it is" and "what it 
signifies," in combination with Aristotle's notion of per se 
predication shows the significance of the basic existence claims 
of a science- L science is the study of things that exist; there 
can be no scientific knowledge of things that do not. As 
Aristotle says in another context, the various sciences "cut off 
some part of what is and investigate its attributes,"^-1*
Existence claims are needed to guarantee the science- They 
are the existential underpinning that gives the definitions a 
grip on reality. Even if they did not appear in any proofs as 
premisses, they would be presupposed in proofs, since without 
them the science might be a science of the non-existent, and 
therefore not a science at all. The links are straightforward; 
science deals in the per se, the per se depends on "what it is," 
and the "what it is" entails and presupposes existence.
Therefore, some existence-claims are needed.
It is possible to think of a body of knowledge organized into 
demonstrative fora as a kind of evolutionary story, beginning 
with the simplest, primitive facts and showing how more complex 
facts emerge. "In the beyianing" there are the indemonstrable 
principles and subseguently there develops the balance of the 
science.15 A slightly different way of seeing this situation is 
to consider what materials are available for use in proofs at the 
beginning; the axioms, the existence of the primitive subjects, 
and their definitions which state "what it is." The derivative
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subjects cannot be used, since they are not yet known to exist. 
Their definitions at this stage have only the status of saying 
"what it signifies" and only after a derivative subject*s 
existence is proved is its "what it signifies" promoted to "what 
it is." Likewise for the attributes. Given that a subject 
exists, the science has to prove that it has certain per se 
attributes, and thus that the attributes exist. Only at that 
point do the definitions of the attributes gualify as indicating 
"what it is."
Aristotle's careful choice of words in 1.10 shows that he was 
sensitive to this issue.
"Proper things are (a) those things which are 
assumed to exist... They assume that these exist 
and that they are this, (b) The per se attributes 
of these they assume what each signifies." {1.10 
76b3, b5-7)
"That they are this" is best taken as an emphatic way of saying 
that this is their definition {"what it is").16
3riefly stated, the function of the existence claims is to 
introduce things into the realm of discourse of the science, to 
introduce them as subjects for per se predications. The 
primitive existence claims, which are scientific principles, 
introduce the primitive subjects and then in the course of its 
progress the science proves the existence of the derivative 
subjects, i.e·, establishes derivative existence claims, which 
therefore entitle the derivative things to be subjects of their 
own per se attributes.
IV. The Nature of Existence Assumptions
At this point, the guestion arises whether the form and force 
of the existence claims is unrestricted ("so and so exists") or 
restricted to the subject genus of the science in guestion (e.g., 
"so and so exists as a spatial magnitude"). Aristotle speaks as 
if the existence claims are unrestricted in form, but we may 
wonder whether their force is unrestricted^ in asserting that 
lines exist, does the geometer mean just that there are lines in 
the world, or that there are lines which are subjects of 
geometry? In a geometrical context it is reasonable to suppose 
that an existence claim of unrestricted form is intended to be 
understood in the restricted way, with the implicit specification 
that lines do not just exist, but that they exist in the way that 
is relevant to geometry, i.e., that they occupy a place in the 
subject genus of geometry.
Two objections can be made to this suggestion. First, it 
violates the separation of existence claims from definitions. If
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"lines exist" is to be taken as "lines are spatial magnitudes," 
the existence claim becomes a specification of a genus of the 
subjects, which is either mentioned explicitly in the subject’s 
definition or is implied by it. Either way, it is a per sg 
relation, and so is related to the "what it is" and therefore to 
the definition of the subject. Second, a claim that a subject 
exists must not simply locate it in a subject genus. Its main 
function is to assert that there are things in reality to which 
the subject applies, to guarantee that the science has as its 
object a division of things that are. The things that are are 
divided up variously and treated variously by the different 
sciences, but all sciences are rooted in the same reality. It is 
the existence claims that provide these roots.
These objections are useful correctives, but they go too far. 
An existence claim is not to be taken as simply asserting that a 
subject belongs to the subject genus of the science, but rather 
that there is such a thing in reality. But at the same time it 
is to be understood that that existing thing is a subject of the 
science. The scientist is not idly calling attention to the 
existence of certain things in the world when he says that they 
exist, but is calling them to our attention as the basic subjects 
of his science. The subject genera of sciences are genera of 
things that are, and so there is no inconsistency in asserting 
that something exists and positing it as a basic subject of a 
science.
The happy result of this discussion is that the separation of 
existence claims from definitions is preserved, and both maintain 
their own functions which are jointly sufficient for the purpose 
of introducing subjects into a science. The existence claim 
simply states that the subject exists; the definition informs us 
what kind of subject it is. Together they identify the subject 
as a member of the genus of the science and locate it in the 
genus. The assertions that lines exist or tigers exist do not 
tell us what sciences study those subjects, to what subject 
genera they belong. The definitions do this much and more.
Being told only that lines exist, we do not yet know what 
discipline we are confronting, what context of discourse we are 
in. But when we are told further that a line is "magnitude 
continuous in one direction,”17 we know both the subject genus 
(spatial magnitude) and the specific nature of lines.18
V. Existence Assumptions as Scientific Principles
The next topic is to see how well primitive existence claims 
satisfy the requirements on scientific principles enumerated in 
I.2. As we have seen, principles are said to be true, primary, 
immediate, more intelligible than, prior to, and grounds for the 
conclusions. There is no doubt that the first three conditions 
are satisfied by the primitive existence claims. If there is a
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demonstrative science and it has existence claims which are 
principles, they must be true. Primary and immediate mean 
unprovable, and by requiring that only primitive existence claims 
be principles, we have ruled out the possibility that they could 
be proved on the basis of other more primitive existence claims. 
In addition, their form and function are such that they cannot be 
proved from the definitions, since definitions will not mention 
existence and in fact yer se predication presupposes existence.
As indemonstrable principles, insofar as they are used as 
premisses of demonstrations they will qualify as more 
intelligible than, prior to, and grounds for the conclusions, 
flore specifically, the primitive subjects can reasonably be 
described as prior to, more intelligible than and grounds for the 
derivative subjects whose existence is shown to follow from 
theirs. There therefore appears to be no difficulty in saying 
that basic existence claims qualify as principles on Aristotle's 
criteria.
VI. Is Existence Necessary?
A. The Problem
Finally, are existence claims necessary truths? Is there 
anything in the theory of science to require that the subjects of 
science exist of necessity? Nowhere in APo does Aristotle make 
this demand in so many words. Being necessary is not one of the 
requirements of principles listed in 1.2. Nevertheless, it is 
introduced as a condition for the conclusions of demonstrations19 
and from this it is inferred to be a condition for the 
principles.20 Since primitive existence claims are principles, it 
would follow that they are necessary. Another way to the same 
conclusion begins with proofs of the existence of derivative 
subjects. If the existence of a derivative subject is a 
conclusion of a proof, and if conclusions of demonstrations are 
necessary, then it is a necessary truth that the derivative 
subject exists. Since the existence of a derivative subject 
depends on the existence of one or more primitive subjects, it 
can be argued that the existence of the primitive subjects is 
necessary too.21
To leave the matter at this stage is to endanger Aristotle's 
whole enterprise in the theory of demonstrative science. If the 
objects of science exist of necessity, then precious few 
disciplines can qualify as knowledge. Even for Aristotle, 
astronomy and theology, if they can be reduced to demonstrative 
form, will be the only secure sciences, since the stars and god 
exist eternally and therefore of necessity. 22 The sublunary world 
can be squeezed in only .by special pleading. For example, 
biology might be allowed on the grounds that it is the species of 
animals that exist eternally and of necessity, not the 
individuals. Geometry does not fare any better, since the 
existence of spatial magnitudes depends on the existence of
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things with certain shapes, and most things can perish. The 
problems this interpretation raises for us today are much worse 
than the ones it does for Aristotle, since we no longer believe 
in the eternity of species. Even those who dispute the evolution 
of species must admit that species may become extinct. And the 
eternal existence of stars and planets is no longer tenable. On 
this view, there may be no scientific disciplines left as serious 
contenders for being Aristotelian demonstrative sciences.
Before abandoning the theory to eternal uselessness, it will 
be worth our while to look more closely at the chain of reasoning 
that leads to this uncomfortable result- Conclusions of 
demonstrations are necessary, therefore scientific principles are 
necessary. Whatever is necessary (necessarily true) is eternal 
(eternally true). Therefore scientific principles are eternally 
true. Primitive existence claims are scientific principles, 
therefore they are necessary and eternally true. Therefore the 
primitive subjects of an Aristotelian demonstrative science exist 
eternally and of necessity.
B. A Solution
I do not propose to attack the Aristotelian view that 
necessary implies eternal and necessarily true implies eternally 
true. What bears investigation is the first premiss: 
conclusions of demonstrations are necessary. The only source of 
necessity Aristotle identifies for scientific propositions is the 
definitions. Necessary propositions are per se propositions,23 
which depend on "what it is." Scientific necessity is 
definitional necessity, necessity which depends on essence. This 
account is valuable for understanding what kind of attributes 
subjects have. Given that triangles exist, it is necessary that 
they have 2B. Indeed, this is the sort of use of necessity 
Aristotle is principally concerned with in APo I —  that a 
subject X must have attribute f per se, not that subject x must 
exist. Further, since necessity is connected specifically with 
the per se and with definitions, it seems that there is special 
reason not to think that the existence claims are necessary. At 
least they are not per se, and therefore the arguments relating 
the necessity appropriate to principles with the nature of 
principles as per se predications24 do not apply to them.
There are two basic kinds of proofs in sciences: a proof that
an attribute belongs to a subject per se and a proof that a 
derivative subject exists. It was suggested above that for the 
former kind of proof an assertion that the subject exists may 
well not appear as a premiss. It is a presupposition of the 
demonstration, but the premisses as well as the conclusions can 
be expected to be per se predications of the subject. The form 
of the argument will be:
A belongs per se to B,
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B belongs per se to C,
Therefore, A belongs per se to C-
If the conclusion is necessary and the argument is a 
demonstration, then the premisses are necessary. But that says 
nothing about the assertion that C’s exist. That serves as an 
ontological prop for the argument, but no more. Since existence 
claims introduce subjects for per se predications and do not 
assert any attribute to be true of them per se, the role they 
play in science is very special and quite distinct from the 
function of definitions. It is therefore plausible to suppose 
that in concentrating on the premisses and conclusions of this 
type of demonstration {which is the only kind of demonstration 
clearly envisaged in APo I) Aristotle did not intend his 
assertions to go beyond the necessity that is found in and 
dependent on definitions. And so, if there is a philosophically 
respectable way for a subject to have necessary attributes 
without itself existing of necessity, the problem is solved, at 
least for this class of proofs-
But what of the other kind of proof? If the conclusions of 
all demonstrations are necessary, and some conclusions prove that 
subjects exist, we have to do with things that exist of necessity 
and therefore eternally. The most straightforward way to deal 
with this argument is to deny the first premiss. The conclusions 
of only some demonstrations are necessary, namely the 
demonstrations which prove that one attribute belongs to another 
per se. This move may seem crude, but it is justified by the 
discussion of necessity in APo 1.6, which shows that a 
proposition is necessary if and only if it is per se. And since 
existence claims are separate from definitions, existence cannot 
belong to anything per se.
C. Eternal Existence of Scientific Universals and 
Eternal Existence of Particulars. Two Arguments.
This interpretation has some hurdles to jump before it can be 
accepted. In particular, there is Aristotle’s assertion in APo
1.8 that the conclusions of scientific demonstrations are 
eternal25 and his claim in 1.31 that the objects of science are 
universals, which are "always and everywhere.1,26 Does this not 
prove that the subjects of scientific demonstrations must exist 
always? For unless there is always a subject for the attribute 
to belong to, how can the per se predications which the science 
proves be eternal?
By way of rebutting this argument it is important to notice 
that these passages in 1.8 and 1.31 do not declare explicitly 
that the subjects of sciences are eternal. They are found in 
discussions of the view that the premisses and conclusions of 
scientific proofs are universal. What is said to be universal in
1.8 is scientific propositions, not subjects,27 and so when
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Aristotle speaks there about demonstration and knowledge not 
being "of perishables,"2 it is conclusions of proofs, not 
subjects, that he is calling perishable. A perishable conclusion 
is one which states a perishable fact, one which does not hold at 
all times and places, but only occasionally. Aristotle*s 
example is lunar eclipse, which he conceives as a connection 
between the (eternal) subject moon and the attribute loss of 
light, and which can be treated by a scientific demonstration 
even though lunar eclipses are not always taking place. Much of 
what he says in 1.31 can be taken to apply to universal terms as 
well as propositions, but the examples he gives are propositions 
which can be conclusions of proofs (that the triangle has angles 
whose sum is equal to two right angles, lunar eclipse, and the 
passage of light through a burning-glass. 31 Here as well as in
1.8 there is no clear statement that the subjects of science must 
be eternal.
The context of Aristotle’s assertions of the eternity of the 
premisses and conclusions also helps us to understand what he 
intends. In 1.31 he contrasts scientific knowledge and 
demonstration with perception on the grounds that we perceive a 
particular [fact] (i.e., a fact about a particular subject) in a 
particular place at a particular time,32 but the universal 
[fact], which is the object of science and demonstration, is not 
subject to these temporal and spatial specifications.33 In 
contrast to particulars, which are "this, here and now," 
universais apply "to all"34 and are "always and everywhere."35 
Further, the universal reveals the grouads/explanation.36
What is important for now is the statement that the universal 
is "always" (άει}. This is not argued for, but appears as an 
unsupported premiss in an argument to show that the universal, 
which applies "to all,” is incapable of being perceived.37 
Aristotle simply remarks "we say that that which is always and 
everywhere is universal." We need to discover how to understand 
this assertion, to ascertain whether it means any more than that 
the universal applies "to all" individual cases which fall under 
it, whenever and wherever they occur- If it does not, then a 
possible solution to the problem of the eternity of scientific 
subjects is indicated.
The Greek word άε£ can mean "on each occasion," (I shall call 
this the "distributive" meaning) as well as "always." On one 
reading, then, Aristotle could mean that the universal 
propositions of science hold "on each occasion" that an 
appropriate individual subject exists. Thus the relation between 
triangle and having angles whose sum is equal to two right angles 
holds whenever there exists a triangle. In support of this 
reading is the statement that the universal is "always and 
everywhere." If we turn our attention to the second half of this 
claim, we see how odd it is. It is absurd to take Aristotle as 
maintaining that the universal is in all places, particularly 
since he does not argue for this striking view, but simply 
observes that "we say that that which is always and everywhere is
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universal," as if this were an obvious or commonly accepted view. 
It is far more reasonable to take "everywhere" (πανταχοΟ) 
distributiveiy: the universal is found everywhere that there is
a particular» And likewise "always" (άε£) may be taken 
distributiveiy. Aristotle is simply contrasting the particular, 
which is uniguely locatable in space and time, with the 
universal, which is not uniguely locatable, since it applies to 
all the particulars, whenever (άειί) and wherever {πανταχοΟ) they 
may be.
Hill the same interpretation apply to 1.8? It works just as 
well for one of the two passages in question:
"Demonstrations and scientific knowledge of things 
which occur repeatedly,38 such as lunar eclipse, 
are always (άευ), insofar as they [demonstrations 
and scientific knowledge] are of something of a 
certain kind, but are partial39 insofar as 
they [the things which occur repeatedly] are not 
always." (1.8 75b33-35)
Aristotle tells us that eclipses occur "repeatedly," but not 
always. And there is demonstration and scientific knowledge of 
eclipses even so, and such demonstration and knowledge holds 
"always." The knowledge and proof concerned with such things 
apply to all cases, whenever they occur, and insofar as science 
treats individual cases, it holds of them with appropriate 
restrictions.
The other passage in 1.8 uses the word "eternal" (άύδι,ον) 
rather than "always" (άε£). This may appear more difficult to 
gloss in the reguired way.
"It is also clear that if the premisses on which 
the deduction depends are universal, also the 
conclusion of such a demonstration, i.e., unqual­
ified demonstration, must be eternal." (1.8 75b21-h)
But αο'δεον is an adjective formed from à e C , and if the context 
demands, it may admit the same distributive use. In fact three 
points of similarity between 1.8 and 1.31 encourage taking it in 
this way. First, the context in which the present passage occurs 
argues that universal premisses yield an eternal conclusion and 
so there is no strict demonstration or scientific knowledge of 
particular facts,40 but the universal conclusicn applies to 
particulars only at a particular time and in a way- 1 This is the 
same point about particulars and universals as is made in 1.31.42
Second, both chapters speak of particulars as belonging to 
kinds or sorts43 and contrast the nature of the particulars with 
that of the sorts:
"Insofar as they [demonstration and scientific
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knowledge] are of something of a certain kind, they 
are always, but insofar as they [the particular 
instances of the kind] are not always, they 
[demonstration and scientific knowledge] are 
partial.”
(ξ μεν τοιοΟδ’ εεσ£ν, άεε εεσ£ν, Ç δ’ ούκ 
άε£, κατά μέρος εέσέν (1.8 75b34-5))
"Even if perception is of what is of a certain 
kind and not of an individual, still it is neces­
sary to perceive an individual here and now."
(çi. γαρ χαι εστεν ή αεσθησες τοΟ τοεοΟδε και. μη 
τοΰδέ τενος, άλλ’ αεσθ<£νεσθαε γε άναγκαεον τάδε τε 
καε πού καε vöv (I.31 87b28-30) )
Both passages point to differences between treating particulars 
as particulars^4 and as things of a certain kind, i.e., as 
instances of a certain universal.
Third, in the contexts of 1.8 in which the words occur αεδεον 
does the same work as άεέ. in context the statement that the 
conclusion of unqualified demonstration is άέδεον amounts to the 
same as the statement that demonstrations and scientific 
knowledge are άειί. Both passages contrast proper scientific 
knowledge of universals with the qualified scientific knowledge 
which can be had of perishable particulars on the grounds that 
when applied to particulars scientific demonstrations and their 
conclusions are taken not in their full generality, but with the 
qualifications needed to adapt them to the limited circumstances 
of the particulars in question. Unqualified demonstrations, 
conclusions of demonstrations, and scientific knowledge are 
described as being άέδεον or àzC in order to contrast them with 
their limited applicability to a given perishable particular. 
Accordingly, in 1.8 the conditions for use of άέδεον appear to be 
identical to those for άειί, and also the same as those for άεί in 
1.31.
The discussion so far points to the conclusion that Aristotle 
did not require the subjects of his sciences to be eternal. In 
fact, the passages from 1.8 and 1.31 examined above say clearly 
that the particulars to which scientific propositions apply are 
not eternally existent. The universals, which are the proper 
objects of demonstration and scientific knowledge, are described 
as beinij "always and everywhere," and the contexts of these 
statements permit them to be read as saying only that universals 
apply to all their individual cases, not that there are 
individual cases of them in all places and at all times. On this 
interpretation, scientific existence claims need not be eternal 
truths, but must hold only as long as the appropriate kinds of 
individuals exist. Demonstrations prove that the individuals 
that fall under the universal must have certain attributes as 
long as they fall under the universal. The universal must always 
have those attributes too, but "always" here simply means "in all
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cases, whenever a case occurs.”
This interpretation of the ”eternity” of universals stresses 
the ontological dependency of universals on the existence of 
individuals of the appropriate kinds. Insofar as universals are 
parasitic on particulars, the '»eternity” of scientific proofs, 
conclusions and knowledge oust somehow be grounded in the 
temporary existence of perishable particulars. On the other 
hand, APo makes it clear that scientific knowledge is primarily 
of universals and only derivatively of particulars. From the 
epistemological point of view, particulars are parasitic on 
universals. The reversal of priority can be expected to cause 
difficulties for Aristotle, and the problem of the "eternity” of 
the subjects of sciences is a clear example of such a difficulty.
Another approach to the problem is suggested by Aristotle's 
discussion in Physics IF. 12 of what it is to be in time.45
"Things which are always {τα άευ δντα), insofar as 
they are always, are not in time, for they are not 
contained by time, nor is their existence measured 
by time.... Now it is also clear that not everything 
that does not exist will be in time, e.g., all those 
which cannot be otherwise [sc. than non-existent], 
as the diagonal [of a square] is commensurable with 
the side.... Non-existent things include all things 
whose opposites are always, e.g., that the diagonal 
is incommensurable with the side is always, and this 
will not be in time." (Phys. IF. 12 221b3-5, b23-5,
222a3-6)
It is the conclusion of a scientific proof that the diagonal of a 
square is incommensurable with its side, and this conclusion is 
said not to be in time. We may take this as holding generally 
for per se relations. These are contrasted with perishable 
particulars.
"All things that are perishable and generable and 
in general existing at some times and not at 
others must be in time." (Phys. IF-12 221b28-30)
This interpretation of the assertion that universals are always 
suggests a corresponding interpretation of the assertion that 
they are everywhere: universals are not in space. 46 These are
consequences of the view of universals as abstract entities. He 
move from individuals to universals by a process of abstracting 
the incidental attributes of the universals. «hat is not 
incidental depends on what aspect of the individuals is being 
considered. Different sciences will abstract different 
attributes.47 But certain attributes are incidental for all 
sciences —  attributes which concern the individual qua 
individual. Foremost among these are those which locate the 
individuals in space and t i m e . T h e  universal which results from 
this abstraction is timeless, where "-less" is a true privative:
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temporal considerations have been set aside and we are left with 
an entity which exists irrespective of time.
On this interpretation, universals are "always and everywhere" 
in that considerations of time and space are irrelevant. Science 
treats individuals timelessly^ Scientific demonstrations are at 
the level of universals and so they prove attributes to belong 
timelessly in that they belong to universals as such. A proof 
applies only secondarily and incidentally to the particulars 
which fall under the universal which is its subject. Scientific 
existence claims are eternal truths in the way Aristotle 
characterizes them in the Physics; they are not in time. Thus 
there is no need to reguire infinitely long lasting particulars 
as objects of scientific knowledge, or even infinitely long 
lasting universals. Bhat makes a subject suitable for science is 
for it to be introduced into the discourse of the science without 
reference to time, and this is what existence claims are called 
upon to do. On this account there is nothing in the nature of 
Aristotelian demonstrative science to demand that the subjects 
exist of necessity, only that given their (timeless) existence, 
the attributes which are proved to belong to them belong per se 
and of necessity.
This second approach to the problem of the "eternity" of 
scientific universals stresses the epistemological priority of 
universals and their timelessness which is one basis for this 
priority, whereas the first approach emphasized their ontological 
dependency on particulars. The two approaches can be combined to 
give a plausible overall solution to the problem. The first 
approach gives ontological legitimacy to a demonstrative science, 
assuring that the universal terms and propositions with which the 
science deals are grounded in and do not go beyond existent 
particulars. The truths of a science do not apply to particulars 
when there are no particulars for them to apply to. Hithout 
actually existing particulars which fall under the universal, 
there is no way in which the universal can properly be said to 
exist, and so there will be no essence and no per se attributes 
for it.
On the other hand, a science treats its subject matter 
timelessly. Accidental considerations of "when" and "where" are 
not relevant to science and have no place in scientific proofs 
and propositions. The timeless universals are reached by 
abstraction from individuals existing in time and space. The 
process of abstracting spatial and temporal properties is needed 
to ensure their legitimacy as subjects of science. Thus, 
although the universal does not exist except when there are 
particular instances of it in existence, science treats the 
universal without reference to the spatio-temporal constraints of 
its particulars.
But what happens when there are no particulars for them to 
apply to? Do they wink cut of existence? The question here is 
not about centaurs and goat-stags, but about eclipses when there
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is no eclipse taking place. Surely scientific knowledge of 
eclipses does not exist only during eclipses. Surely scientific 
propositions about eclipses do not cease to be true in between 
eclipses.
Aristotle is helpful hexe because he considers this case in a 
passage already discussed.49 He allows there to be 
demonstrations and scientific knowledge concerned with lunar 
eclipses because they can be considered as a "such," a thing of a 
certain kind. It is timelessly true that the earth's screening 
the sun's light produces50 a lunar eclipse and this timeless 
truth is what applies to and explains each lunar eclipse when it 
occurs. If eclipses of the moon never occurred, there would be 
nothing to be explained or applied to, and the proposition would 
be science fiction, not a scientific fact. It would not be a per 
se relation and could not be proved.51
There may be a residual doubt based on the possibility of the 
extinction of species. It is likely that California condors or 
some other endangered species will become extinct. Hhile any 
members of a species survive, it is reasonable to suppose that 
there can be Aristotelian demonstrative science of that species. 
The guestion is how the status of the scientific facts about that 
species is affected when the species becomes extinct. Does the 
universal wink out of existence when the last member of the 
species does? Do the necessary, per se truths about that species 
become false or unscientific? Is there no scientific knowledge 
of dodo birds, dinosaurs, or the Big Bang?
There is nothing to show that Aristotle considered this 
guestion or that he had any reason to think that it might arise. 
But it would be another step towards showing that his conception 
of science is useful and not bound to his special scientific 
beliefs if it could be shown that the study of dinosaurs etc. can 
guaiify as scientific.
The key to the solution is thé existential commitment of 
timeless universais. Bust there always be one or more 
individuals existent in time and space for scientific facts about 
the corresponding universal to enjoy their timeless existence?
The answer is surely no. The evidence, again, is the assertion 
that even though there is not always a lunar eclipse taking 
place, still there is demonstration and scientific knowledge of 
eclipses. They guaiify as objects of scientific knowledge 
because they are "of a kind," and so in that way they are always, 
i.e., timelessly. The case of dodos and dinosaurs is relevantly 
the same. Dodos formed a kind, and scientific facts about that 
kind are timelessly true. The fact that there are no dodos now 
is on the same footing as the fact that no lunar eclipse is now 
taking place. Thé fact that there will be no dodos again is 
perhaps unfortunate, but does not affect the issue. The sane 
holds true for all the kinds of dinosaurs and presumably also for 
the Big Bang, although special difficulties are likely to be 
raised by the unigueness of that event and by the guestion of its
location in space and time
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I have suggested two interpretations of the claim that the 
universal scientific facts are "always and everywhere." On the 
first, it means that they apply to all the particulars that fall 
under them: a scientific fact about rabbits applies to all 
rabbits. On the second, it means that they are timelessly true. 
Aristotle would agree with both: the universels science deals
with are timeless and also apply in all relevant cases.
The existence claims for subjects of a science satisfy both 
these demands. They are grounded in the relevant individual 
cases,52 and they introduce the subject into scientific discourse 
as a timeless universal which is the only kind of subject 
appropriate for necessary, per se predications.
The foregoing arguments show that there is no need to 
attribute to Aristotle the view that subjects of a demonstrative 
science exist necessarily and eternally. They also support the 
position that a subject can have necessary attributes without 
itself existing of necessity and show that Aristotle*s assertions 
that premisses and conclusions of demonstrations express 
necessary truths apply only to per se predications, not to 
existence claims. By doing so they have rebutted one challenge 
to the viability of Aristotelian demonstrative science.
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Notes
1. Aristotle does not always distinguish clearly between facts 
and propositions and feels free to nove back and forth between 
the formal and the material mode of expression.
2. APo 1.3.
3. APo 1.2 71b20-2.
4. Especially APo 1.2 and 1.10.
3. In places Aristotle says or implies that an axiom is found in 
all sciences (e.g.# APo 1.2 72a16-17)# and this is true for the 
law of non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle# 
which Aristotle frequently mentions as common principles. It is 
not true# however# for Aristotle's other standard example of a 
common principle: if eguals are subtracted from eguals# the
remainders are equal. This axiom holds only for quantities and 
therefore has no place in non-quantitative sciences. On the 
other hand# it does have a place in more than one quantitative 
science# and in fact it does in all the quantitative sciences 
known to Aristotle. The characterization of common principles as 
those found in more than one science does not give a full account 
of common principles# but at least it picks out the common 
principles from the rest. (Even here allowance must be made for 
the special case of the "subalternate sciences" in which the 
principles and conclusions of one science have a use in another 
science. See my paper "Aristotle's Subordinate Sciences,"
British Journal for the History of Science. 11 (1978)# 197-220.
6. There are other serious obstacles as well# some having to do 
with large scale Aristotelian doctrines# such as his belief in 
real essences and real definitions# his assertion that scientific 
demonstrations are syllogistic, his belief that some facts are 
naturally more intelligible than others# and his views on how we 
come to know scientific principles. It is beyond the scope of 
the present paper to discuss these issues.
7. Cf. II. 2 90a3-4: εε ydp εστε τε η μη εστε τό, έν τους 
τοεοότοες ζητοΟμεν απλώς δ’, εύ εστεν η μη σελήνη η νόξ.
3. 90a12-13.
9. το υποκείμενον (90a12).
10. το μεν γαρ αετεον τ^  μέσον (90a5-6).
11. ρ.3.
12- I refer only to the two types of per se predication Aristotle 
says are specially relevant to demonstrative sciences. These are 
the first two of the four types of per se relations identified at 
APo 1.4 73a34-b24. They are singled out because of the close 
connection they have to necessary predications (73b16-24). Both 
these types of per se predications are characterized in terms of 
essence (τόΙέστε) and definition (¿ λόγος ό λέγων τό εστε) 
(73a34-b1) .
13. APo I. 10 76b3-4, b6- 10, b13.
14. Met. Γ. 1 1003a24-6# cf. APo 1.32 88b1-2.
15. Obviously, development over time is not intended by this 
metaphor.
16. At 76a32-3 he says "what both the primary and the derivative 
things signify is assumed." This preferable to saying that what 
they are is assumed. Neither expression is quite correct# but
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given that Aristotle is going to use the sane expression to apply 
to both, his choice is reasonable.
17. Cf. Bet. Δ.13 1020a 11- 14.
18. Appropriate cautions must be provided to cover subjects in 
vhose definition the subject genus tera does not appear. One 
suggestion is that the subject genus will appear as a tern in at 
least the definitions of primitive subjects and that derivative 
subjects for which this does not happen will be defined in terns 
of one or more primitive subjects, or derivative subjects for 
which this does happen, or derivative subjects for which this 
does not happen but which are themselves defined in terns of 
primitive subjects or derivative subjects for which this 
happens.... Aristotle, however, does not state this view or 
provide a basis for proving it.
19. APo 1.2 71b9-12.
20. APo I.« 73a21-4, 1.6 74b13 ff.
21. An argument to this effect can be constructed along the lines 
of APo 1.6 74b26-32, which argues generally that the principles 
of scientific demonstrations are necessary, since the conclusions 
are necessary and the principles are the grounds of knowing why 
{not only that) the conclusion holds of necessity.
22. Bet. Λ.7-8, Gen. et Corn. 11.11 337b35-338a2.
23. It follows from APo 1.6 74b5-12 that all and only necessary 
connections are per se.
24. Notably the argument at APo 1.6 74b5-12.
25. 75b22-3.
26. 87b32-3, cf. b38-9.
27. προτώσευς, συμπέρασμα (75b21-2, cf. b27-8).
28. 75b24-5.
29. ού καθ’ δλου αύτοΟ έστυν άλλα ποτέ καυ πώς (75b25—6).
30. 1.8 75b33-5.
31. 87b35-6, b39-88a2, 88aî4-16.
32. αύσθώνεσθαέ γε άναγκαϋον τέδε τυ καί που καί vöv (87b29—30).
33. ού γαρ τέδε ούδέ vöv ού γαρ αν ?¡v καθόλου (87b31-2).
34. έπυ πδσυν (87b31).
35- άεύ καύ^πανταχοΟ (87b32).
36. δηλοΰ το αυτυον (88a5-6).
37. 87b30-3.
38. πολλώκυς (75b33) is more effectively rendered by "repeatedly*· 
than by "frequently" or "often.” What is relevant is that they 
happen more than once, not how often they occur. The adverbial 
ending -ώκυς means"times" as in δεκέκυς, «ten times."
39. "Partial" (κατά μέρος) means "not fully general." It covers 
both the contrast between universal and particular and that 
between more general and less general. For this use of the 
expression κατά μέρος, see APo 1.24.
40. In the sense defined on p.12.
41. 75b2 1-6.
42- 1.31 speaks of particulars as locatable in place as well as 
in time (πού καί. vöv (87b3Q) ), whereas 1.8 speaks of the 
demonstration applying to particulars at a particular tine and in 
a way (ποτέ καύ πώς (75b26)). I see no reason think that all 
three qualifications (time, place, and manner) do not apply to 
both discussions.
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43. This assertion applies to both particular subjects and 
particular facts.
44. 1.31 makes it clear that as such they are locatable in time 
and space.
45. 220b32—222a9.
46. This claim is not Aristotelian, since he does not have a 
clear concept of space. On the other hand, his doctrine of place 
in Phys. IV. 1-5 entails that universais are not in any place.
47. For example, geometry considers the spatial aspect of such 
things as have spatial extension and all attributes of those 
things that are irrelevant to their spatial extension are 
incidental to geometry- Similarly, biology considers those 
features of living things that are relevant to them qua living 
and disregards any other features they may possess.
48. Cf. APo 1.31 87b30, etc.
49. APo ΐΓβ 75b33-5.
50. This verb should be understood in the "timeless present" 
tense.
51. The nature of lunar eclipses is perhaps too complicated for 
straightforward exposition, since it has to do with three bodies 
and the behavior of light. The point can be seen more simply for 
the relation between triangle and the attribute of having angles 
whose sum is equal to two right angles.
52. Aristotle sketchy account of how we come to know the 
principles of sciences (APo II. 19) makes it clear that this 
indemonstrable knowledge (νοΟς) ultimately stems from our 
perception of particulars. Presumably this account is intended 
to apply to ail the kinds of scientific principles, including 
existence assumptions.
